Madrid Bombs: An Initial Analysis
Midday 11th March 2004
1. Recap about facts.
2. Could it be ETA?
3. Could it be Islamists?
4. What are the implications?
Early this morning, Spain suffered its worst terrorist atrocity ever when a series of bombs thought to have been packed in luggage exploded on three trains bound for three railway stations in central Madrid. At least 173 people have been killed. No group has yet claimed responsibility, but the Spanish Government are emphatically blaming the Basque separatist terrorist group ETA. We believe that the signs point instead to international Islamists linked to al-Qa??ida (AQ), though ETA is a moderately credible candidate. This paper addresses the question of who did it, and what the longer-term implications are of this.
Could it be ETA?
The Spanish authorities have been quick to blame the attacks on ETA. Their thinking is almost certainly based on two previous incidents. In February two suspected ETA members were arrested with 506kg of chloratite and 30kg of dynamite hidden in their truck, apparently as they headed for Madrid 100 miles away. In December the Spanish security forces claimed they had foiled a plot to attack San Martin station when a 25kg bomb was found on board a San Sebastian-Madrid train. The Spanish also believe that ETA would be keen to mount a major operation given a recent wave of arrests ?? which the authorities claimed had done major damage to the group ?? and the fact that 2003 saw the smallest number of killings by the organisation.
However, the head of the Basque separatist party Batasuna, Arnaldo Otegui, has suggested that the attacks were the work of ??the Arab resistance? and, until ETA make a verifiable claim of responsibility or evidence emerges implicating the Basque separatists, this attack needs to be seen in context. The single largest ETA attack previously was 19th June 1987; 21 people were killed when a car bomb exploded in a multi-storey car park below a Barcelona supermarket. This attack, in terms of simple lethality, would therefore represent a substantial leap. More than this, at one bound ETA would have killed more people than it has managed in any year of its 35-year campaign; the previous record is 118 (in 1980).
The comparative lethality of the attack is not an accident. Three bombs went off on one train heading into Atocha station; another two trains, heading into two other stations, were also attacked. The intention in the Atocha attack in particular seems to have been to destroy at least one carriage and perhaps derail the train, so magnifying the human effect of the blasts. This is not consistent with ETA??s standard modus operandi.
ETA has killed over 800 people since 1968. This averages at a little over 20 killed a year. This comparatively small number is again not an accident. In part it reflects the size of the organisation. Mostly, however, it reflects a deliberate targeting policy. ETA tends not to launch indiscriminate mass-casualty attacks. Where the organisation has mounted multiple bomb attacks they have used small devices against largely commercial targets (tourist resorts being a particular favourite); the aim has been to create fear and do economic damage while causing a minimal number of casualties. The vast bulk of ETA??s victims have been killed in targeted assassinations, either by bullet or the bomb; most have been political figures, policemen, military personnel or anti-ETA Basques. While the December operation would suggest that ETA might have been planning a major mass-casualty attack, and the quantity of explosives found would have been capable of doing the most dramatic damage seen in the Atocha attack (with the roof of the carriage torn away and part of the carriage blown out), the combination of the lethality of intent in the operation as a whole, the lethal nature of the multiple attacks, and the exclusively civilian (and only indirectly commercial) target, suggest that this is entirely out of character for the group.
Politically, it seems to make little sense for ETA to mount such an attack on the eve of elections. The ruling Popular Party has made much political capital out of its stance against the Basque separatists, and the opposition party has been tainted by an alleged deal and contact with the group. Any attack would only harden the Spanish electorate??s attitude toward ETA and swing the vote further away from the Socialist Party towards Aznar??s conservatives, who have taken a very hard line against the group that has met with considerable success. However, logic does not always dictate a terrorist group??s actions, and it is conceivable that ETA are seeing out Aznar (whose term is up) with a big bang. Furthermore, the Socialist??s attempts to attack the Popular Party on its Iraq policy have all missed the target ?? despite an estimated 90% of the population against the war, polls released this week showed the conservatives winning by five or six percentage points and probably retaining its majority. In the light of this, it would make strategic sense for an Islamist group to mount such an attack in an attempt to swing the vote to the Socialists whose stated policies would withdraw the country from its perceived alliance with the US.
Could it be Islamists?
The pattern of attacks fits most accurately with al-Qa??ida, however. Spain has long been a target for Islamist anger, for a number of reasons:
· Spain is a target of Islamist hatred: Prime Minister Jose María Aznar was an early and public supporter of the United States in its campaign in Afghanistan in October 2001. Together with the UK, Spain was the only country to associate itself publicly and unequivocally with the US-led Coalition. It took a similarly enthusiastic line with regards to the Iraq campaign, and has been targeted in Iraq. In late 2003 seven military intelligence officers were killed, and one wounded, when their unmarked vehicles were attacked with automatic weapons; separately, an intelligence sergeant was shot dead outside his accommodation in Baghdad.
· Spain is taking firm action against AQ: in September 2003 leading investigating magistrate Baltazar Garzón indicted 35 people for terrorist activities linked to AQ. The list included an a number of people now in custody in Spain, including Abu Dahdah and Abu Musab al-Suri, Spanish-Syrian
· Spain has an established Islamist presence: in the late 1990s there were several Islamist extremist of security concern living in Spain, including Abu Musab al-Suri and Abu Dahdah, half-Spanish, half-Syrian men known to be very closely linked to AQ. In summer 2001, Tarragona was the site for covert operational meetings between Muhammad Atta (the leader of the 9/11 terrorist team) and Ramzi Binalshibh (an AQ figure involved in the planning for 9/11, now in custody). This in itself suggests that AQ had a covert infrastructure good enough to make them confident that they could travel to, enter, live in and leave Spain without coming to official notice. Garzón??s deposition describes Spain as "a place or base for resting, preparation, indoctrinating, support and financing" of AQ, and this view is well founded.
· Spain has a special place in Arab history: it was part of the Arab world from shortly after the establishment of Islam until 1492. In the eyes of Islamists, the post-Crusade diminution of Arab influence and power is an abiding source of shame, and one which needs to be avenged. Even today, the Spanish claim to the island of Perejil, off Morocco, and its occupation of the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa, are seen as symbols of Crusader occupation of Arab lands.
· Spain is a benign operating environment for Islamists: history and geographical proximity mean that there are large numbers of North Africans living and working in Spain, much as is the case in France. Islamist terrorists from North Africa (where some of the most ruthless and effective AQ operators originate) have the cultural awareness and language skills to blend in among the many thousands of peaceful North Africans in the country.
· The Spanish have also been targeted in Iraq. In November seven military intelligence officers were killed, and an eighth wounded, when their unmarked vehicles were attacked with automatic weapons. In October, an intelligence sergeant was shot dead outside his accommodation in Baghdad. (Two other Spaniards have also been killed, one in the suicide attack on the UNHQ in Baghdad, one in a law enforcement operation.) The keen Spanish participation in the occupation and the political support offered by Aznar to George W. Bush in the wider War on Terror has caused Madrid to attract the rhetorical attention of AQ and the wider Islamic radical world.
· The method of this morning??s attacks precisely fit AQ??s methods: AQ seek to shock by killing civilians, as military and diplomatic targets have become better defended since 9/11. Attacks in Djerba (tourist site), Bali (bars), East Africa (hotel, aircraft), Ankara (office block) and Jakarta (hotel) were all designed to cause the largest possible number of civilian casualties; moreover, AQ has considerable experience in large-scale bombs, usually made of low explosives, and in well-co-ordinated simultaneous attacks. These latest attacks fit the pattern both in terms of type of target, weapon, co-ordination and ruthlessness.
Implications
As we have previously commented, there is a distinct trend in terrorism which these attacks illustrate. Firstly, better defences of prime military/political targets mean that terrorists are moving increasingly towards attacking ??soft?? targets which, by definition, one cannot effectively defend. Secondly, the savagery of terrorism in recent years ?? particularly 9/11 ?? has caused ??atrocity inflation??, so terrorists of all types need to cause an increasing amount of carnage in order to achieve the same psychological impact. Sadly, we see this trend as continuing. Businesses identified with Coalition countries will continue to be at risk and will have to form a clear judgement on the extent to which they are at threat, and take reasonable precautions while acknowledging that the terrorists will always be able to attack a target if it is a ??soft?? one.
